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harmonia which Aristotle overlooks, in which a harmonia is
something cau sal l y dependent on but distinct fromaa certain
disposition of materials, e.g. a melody is distinct from the

strings which produce it, and equally from the tuning of the
strings, though wi th ou t strings there could be no tuning, and
without tuni n g no melody.
The word has this sense especially
in mu s i c al contexts, meaning variously 'scale', 'mode' or
g e nera lly 'music' (v. LSJ).
Given, then , that the el ements

in

question are those

etc.

(which are

stuff) , there

the thesis
a)

which

compose the human

pr esum ab ly thought of

app ear to

be

four

as

bod y , hot

po ssible interpretations of

that the soul is a har mon i a of these

The

cold,

,

different kinds of

soul is ide n ti cal with the

� a tio

elem ents

:

or fo rmul a

according to whtch the el em en ts are combined to form th e
living man;
b)
Th e soul is i denti cal with th e mixture or combina
tion of those el em en ts according to th a t formula;
c)
Th e soul i s some entity produced by the combination
of those elements according to that formula, but ·distinct.
alike from them and from· the formula itself;
d)
The soul is identical with a s tat e of the bod ily
elements, viz. the state of being com bined according to
that formula.
·

It mi ght be objected at this point that the third al tern a
tive is illusory, since even where the harmo nia is a scale or
me lo dy it must be considered identical with a mixture of elements.
This

on the assumption that the elements in
or other physical objects which compose the
i n st ru me n t which produces the music, but this assumption is mis
taken.
Just as the elements of a physical constitution, e.g.
the livin g human body, are the hot, the cold and so on, so the
e lem ents of a piece of music are the high and the low, which
are conceived of as being mixed together in th e proper propor
ti ons to gi v e the right notes, e i th er in t he sense th at each
note is tho ug h t of as consisting of so much of the high mixed
with so much of the low, or in the sense that each mode or
scale is produced by combining so �any high notes in fix ed
ratios with so many low notes.
The ele men ts , therefore, out
of which a m usi cal harmonia is formed are themselves musical
entities, the high and the low, and not the physical objects
which produce the sounds.
This view of the elements of a
musical harmonia is cl ea rl y expressed for instance in the
pseudo-Aristotelean tr e ati se De Mundo, 396b 7f f. (DK 22 B 10):
'Mu s ic makes a si ngle harmonia-out of different sounds by mixing together high and low, long and short notes '.
On this
view of a mus ical harmonia, then, the harmonia cannot be
separated from it s e l em ent s , and so this view do e s not admit
the third interpretation o f the soul -h armon i a as an independent alternative to the first t wo.
seems

implausible

q ues t io n are s trin gs

But

while thi s view of the nature of mu s ic al harmonia
th e standard viaw of musical theory, and give�
the most exact parallel to 0th.er kinds of harmonia, e.g. the
appears to be
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the

formation of physical substances out of the elements,

or

production of a

and the

certain temperature by

mixing

the hot

cold, it is not the view of musical harmonia which Simmias
uses to illustrate his thesis that the soul is a harmonia.
For

Simmias'

parallelism
are

a physical

object

and

b)

of

involves positing a

each of which the

dependent on that object.

a non-physical entity

terms

causal
the incorpor
eal soul we have the musical harmonia, which is 'invisible and
incorporeal and all-beautiful and divine' (85e 5-6), while
corresponding to the physical body we have not the high and
the low but the physical strings and pegs of the lyre, which
can be broken a part and left lying around after.the harmonia
has vanished.
It is true that Sirn.mias slightly distorts the
parallel when he says (85b 5-c 1) that the soul is a harmonia
of the hot, cold, e tc . , in the bo�y, since a more exact parallel
to the strings etc., of the lyre would seem to be provided by
the limbs and ·organs of the body than by their microsc o pic
elements.
But the essential point is to contrast the incor
poreal product with its physical cause, and in order to make
this contrast it is unnecess a ry for Simmias clearly to distin
guish the physical macroscopic parts of the body from their
own elements, which are no doubt conceived of as minute but
equally corporeal parts.
The relation of musical harmonia to
its e lements which Simmias is using cannot therefore be th at
between a scale or tune and the musical elements of high and
low etc., but must be that between a musical instrument and
some non-physical entity produced by a certain state of the
instrument.
This, then, enables us immediately to eliminate the
second of our four su g g e s t ed interpretations of the soul
harrnonia thesis, viz. that the soul is identical with th e
mixture or,combination of the bodily elements accor d ing to
a certaid ratid or formula.
For it would be clearly absurd
to make a sharp contrast between the physical elements and
the non-physical harmonia if the latt e r just was identical
One might as
with the elements in a certain arrangement.
sensibly contrast the invisible, in corp oreal plum-pudding
with the gross, earthy suet, raisins, flour etc. which com
pose it.
This still leaves us with three a l t ernati v e s , that
the relation of the soul t o the bo d y is
a) that of t he ratio
of the tuned strings to the strings themselves, or
b) that
of the music produced by the instrument to the instrument
itself, or
c) that of the state of being in tune to the
strings.
There seems no conclusive evidence from the dialogue
which alternative Plato had in mind, or indeed whether he had
clearly distinguished the three.
Various phrases give some
hints, but these are conf lictin g and inconclusive.
Thus for
instance the description of musical harmonia as 'all-beautiful
and divine' might seem most readily applicable to the music
produced by the instrument; but when we reflect that the speak
er is a pupil of the Pythagorean Philolaos, and might therefore
ly

a)

presentation of his thesis
between two relations,

Thus corresponding to
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to have a live l y reveren c e for numbers as the sour c e
o f a ll things , this argument seems t o have little force as
between alternatives a ) and b ) .
Ra ther stronger is the argument
from Simmias' statement at 92d 2 tha t the s oul -har monia doctrine

be expe c ted

is a c c e p t e d by most pe ople; surely, it may be argued, this indi c 
ates that the soul i s some thing distin c t from a mathematical
r at i o , since such an obscure theory can never have been held by
t he majority of ordinary people.
On the other h a nd , the view

that the soul is some thin g non-physi c al,

which is yet d ependent
on a certain state of the body, so that when that state is
di sr upt ed the so ul is dissipated , mi g h t seem to be a be l ie f

quite congenial to c ommon sense.
But a g ains t this we have the
c omparison of the soul at 86c 6-7 to 'harmoniai in sounds and
in all t he works of the c raftsmen'.
'All the w6rks of the

c raf tsm en ' must include st atua ry and painting , and probably
carpentry and house-building as well.
Where, in the c ases of
the produ c ts of these arts , are we to lil ok for the non - phys i c al
product of the phy si c a l elements?
Surely in th e harmony or
proportion of the c onstituent pa r ts , as exemplified by di f f ere n t
amounts of differently-coloured pa i n t s , or by the relat ion s
between the dimensions of various parts of a statue ,or a pj . ece
of

fu rnit u r e

every

.

It would be too

fantastic to suggest

that to

··

·

w el l - m ade table there corresponds a non - phy s i c al entity

w h i c h is related to the dispositions of its parts as the non 
p hys i c al soul is to the dispos it ion of the bodily elements.

This c om p arison , then, tends in the opposit e dire c tion from
the remark at 92d 2 that most people accept the soul - harm oni a
thesis.
Further difficulty is c re ated by th e description of
the soul at 86b 9 as a mixt u r e (krasis) of the bodily elements.
The word kras is , which is re g ul a rl y used as a syn on y m for

harmonia (e.g. Ar . De An. 408a 30-31 ), c ommonly o c c urs, like
the English 'mixture' in c ontexts whi c h leave it open whether
the w ord refers to the state of being mixed together or to
the c o mpoun d of e l em e nt s which are mix e d up.
We hav e seen
that the second a lterna t ive is cle a rly una c c eptable, but what

about the first?
Can Plato m e an that the soul is identi c al
neither with a ratio nor with any p rodu c t of a rat1o, but
rather with a certain s tat e of the body,
on

the elements

of the b ody are

in

viz.the stat� in

a c e r t a in ratio?
While
the one hand this would give a fair ac c ount of the c ompari

which

son of the soul with works of art, on the other hand it fits
rather 111 with the sh ar p c ontrast between the i nvisible , div
ine musi c al harmoni a and the physical i n s trume nt , while again

it

might well seem very dubious that most people believe that
soul is nothin g other than a bo d ily state.
There appear ,
then, to be hint s in the text of t h e di alog u e of support for
all three po s sibl e interp r e t ations of the soul-harmo�ia thesis,
a) t hat the soul is identical with a ratio of the bo d i ly ele
the

ments,

b)

that it is identical with some non-physi c al produ c t

that i t i s identi c al with the state of
It might thus appe ar that Plato has
failed to distinguish these a lt e rn ative s ; before leaving this
que s tion , however, we should look at som e evidence from other
sour c es, to see whether they throw any li g h t on Plato's mean

o f that r a t io and c )
being in that ratio.

ing.
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be natural to assume that it was current in the Pythagorean
circle to which they belonged.
Though they are described as
pupils of

Philolaos

( 6ld-e; D.L.

viii,

46),

the theory itself

is not ascribed to him by any writer earlier than Macrobius
(4-5 cent. A.D. ) , who says that Pythagoras and Philolaos held

that the soul is a harmonia (DK 44 A 23).
It is not clear how
much reliance can be put on this testimony, since there is
obviously a possibility that it may derive ultimately from

this very passage of the Phaedo.

But

whatever may

be

the

truth about that, it is highly unlikely that Philolass' view
of the soul can be reconciled with the harmonia theory as

expounded by Simmias.

For at

6la-62b

it is implied that

Philolaos taught that suicide was wrong on the ground that
the soul is put by the gods in the body as a prison for a
set time, and must not seek to escape before the time of
its release, but that a philosopher will �elcome death, pre�
sumably because his soul will have a better existence in

separation from the body.
This is supported by a quotation
from Philolaos given by Clement of Alexandria (DK 44 B 14)

'the soul is yoked to the body and as it were buried in this
tomb as a punishment'.
The conclusion from this i� plain,
that unlike his pupils who take part in the dialogue, Philo
laos believed that the soul exists independently of the body.

It is not impossible that he may have held some version of
the theory, in which the soul was a non-physical entity whose

association with the body depended on the maintainance of the
proper bodily ratio, but the divergence from the view expres
sed by Simmias is so great that it is obviously fruitless to

attempt to interpret the latter in such a way as to assimilate
it to some conjectural reconstruction of Philolaos' view.
I

conclude,

then,

that not only is there no evidence

that

the soul-harmonia thesis definitely identifies the soul either
with a ratio of its elements or with the state of being in that
ratio or with some entity dependent on the possession of that
ratio, but that we can best account for what is said in the
dialogue on the assumption that Plato did not clearly distin
guish the three possibilities.
Nor is this particularly sur
prising; for in the first place the distinction is a very fine

one

between the

soul's actually

being a ratio

and its being

the state of having one's elements in a ratio, since in either
case having a soul will be identical with having one's elements
in a ratio.
It is possible.to be alear about the distinction
only if one clearly distinghishes purely mathematical entities
such as numbers from states of phy�ical objects which can be
described in mathematical terms.
Failure to make this distinc
tion was the ground of one of Aristotle's criticisms of the
Pythagoreans (Met. A8, 989b29-990a32), while we have seen that

the presentation of the thesis by Simmias in the dialogue is
While the distinction between the soul as
similarly unclear.
a ratio and as an entity supervening on the possession of a
ratio is more obvious, Aristotle's example of health which we
have

already noticed indicates

that that distinction too may

7

be easy to overlook.
the thesis

we shall

In c on s i d e r i n g Pl ato's arguments ag ainst
therefore have to regard them as concerned

with a thesis which contains in an undifferentiated form the
thr•ee alternative senses which we have considered.
Socrates' first argument against the thesis requires little
comment.
He points out that it is inconsistent with the doctrine,
which was earlier accepted, that all knowledge is in fact recol
lection of what the soul had learnt in a previous existence when
it was not as s oc i a t e d with the body.
No harmonia can exist unless
the elements of which it is a harmonia are already in existence,
and hence if the soul is a harmonia of the bodily elements it
cannot have h ad a previous n on - b odil y existence (9le-92e).
This
argument is valid against any interpretation of the harmonia
thesis; obviously a b o di ly state cannot exist unless some body
exists of which it is the st ate, and equally obviously a non
physical e nt ity causally dependent on a ratio of bodily elements
cannot exist before those elements have been combined in that
r ati o .
A defender of the thesis might� however, argue that it
is n o t cogent against the identification of the soul with the
mathematical ratio itself.
For a ratio, being a timeless mathe
matical entity, cannot itself be said to come into existence
whenever it is embodied in some particular m aterial.
Since it
exists equally at all time, it may truly be said to have existed
before a certain body ca me into being, and hence the argument
from recollection does not refute this version of the thesis.
This defence is not, however, adopted by Simmias, who agrees
that his thesis is inco n s i stent with the doctrine that all
knowledge is recollection.
Nor is it difficult to see why.
For it is possible to d e fend the soul-harmonia against this
argument on l y at the cost of making it a ·universal; if a certain
set of elements c o m b ine in the ratio 3/4, then indeed that ratio
existed before the combination of the elements, but the thing
tha.t existed was the ratio 3/4, i.e., the very same rat i o which
is exempllf:ied whenever three units are related to four units.
Thus anyone who held this t h eor y would have to admit that it was
logically possible for many things to have the same soul, includ
ing things which w ould generally be reckoned inanimate, e.g.,
geometrical diagrams, since there is no reason why the same ratio
which is embodied in a particular human being and is his soul
It is not,
might not also hold. between certain lines and angles.
of course,
this;

impossible that

it might,

transmigration.

anyone may

for instance,

have believed

;
something lik e

to account for
Empedocles would on this view have been a bush

and a fish because one

provide

and the

a

theory

same ratio was embodied in bush,

all had the same soul.
Simmias,
have none of this; if his version of the theory is
interpreted as making the soul a mathematic al entity, it must be
such an entity individuated by being embodied in these bodily
elements.
As such it clearly c a nnot exist independently of the
elements by reference to which it is individuated, any more than
Socrates' height can exist independently of S oc r a t es , though in
the sense in which Socrates' height is a uni v e r s a l , say four
cubits, that length may be said always to have existed, or rather
never to have come into �xistence, whether or not Socrates exists.
fish and

Empedocles,

however,

will

i.e.,

they

8

This way of looking at the soul-harmonia has the advantage of

preserving as a necessary truth that different persons have
numerically different souls, whereas on the other interpreta
tion

two contemporaneous persons might discover as the result

of physiological investigation that they

It leaves the thesis open,

of

inconsistency

however,

had the same soul.

to attack on the grounds

with the doctrine of

knowledge as recollec

tion; whether one considers it ad�quately refuted on those
grounds Will naturally depend on the strength of one's convic
tion in the soul's pre-existence.

The remaining arguments are more problematical, in that
commentators have disagreed not so much as to their conclusive
ness, but rather on the question of how many
employs, and just what these arguments are..
in

C.Q.

1954,

pp.

16-22

arguments Socrates
Like Miss Hicken

and Bluck in his commentary,

I discern

two-arguments, as opposed, for instance, to the four spec fied
by Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle's De An� A4.
These arguments are not, however, presented consecutively; at
92e4-93al0 Socrates gives a set of premisses (A) which are not

f

immediately used in the argument.
gins a new argument by formulating

Instead, at
a principle

:93a11�12 he
which ·1.s to

be
·some ..

extent independent of the set .of premisses A.
This argument
continues to its conclusion at 9�al2-b2; for convenience this
whole argument may

be called B.

Then

at

94b4

Socrates returns

to the set of premisses A, which he uses to construct the se
cond argument, which we may call Al, whose conclusion is reached
at 95a2.
While I shall deal first with argument B, it is

necessary first to look at premisses A, in order to determine
the relation they have to the principle with �hich Socrates
begins B.2
·

A begins with the acceptance by

Simmias of the proposition

that the qualities of a harmonia are determined by those of its
elements (92e4G93a2; let this be labelled al).
We then have

three succesive applications of this principle, first to all
activities and passivities of the harmonia (93a4-5; al.l) and

then to a particular activity and some particular passivities
In virtue of the prin
which are ruled out by the principle.
ciple it is impossible for a harmonia to lead or control its
elements, but it must rather be controlled by them (93a6-7;
al.11), and it is impossible for it to be affected in any way
contrary to that which -its elements determine

( 93a8-9;

al.12).

is al.11 and al.12 which provide the premisses for argument
A
At 93all-12 we have the principle which marks the begin
ning of argument B:
'Well, now, doesn't every harmonia have to
be the kind of harmonia which corresponds to the way that it is

ry

.

attuned

(or arranged)1

(bl).

It is not

easy

to find a

transla

tion which is both exact and ·comprehensible but the next sen
tence, giving an application of the principle, makes fairly
clear what is meant; if a Harmonia is more attuned, then it is
more (of) a harmonia, and if it is less attuned it is less (of)

is

The grounds for rejecting Philoponus' interpretation, which
followed, not without incoherence, by Archer-Hind and Hackforth,

2

See Appendix

1

are

cogently

stated

by Miss Hicken,

pp.

17-8.

9

a�arornmia

(93al4-b2;

bl.l ) .

The

sense

of bl it se l f

can then

fo rmal ly , as follows, that where 1¢1 stands
for an adjective which c an apply toaaharmonia, and where '¢ly'
is the adverb formed from'¢', then for all x, if x is a harmonWhile
ia) if x is attuned or arranged ¢ly, x is a 95 harmonia.
this cer·tainly goes beyond-anything that is said in A, it seems
an extremeview of Miss Hicken that S o cr at es here begins
'an
e ntir ely new set of admissions'; rather we might say that this
best

be

expressed

'formal' account of the d epend e n c e of the harmonia on what gives
rise to it is tt least suggested by what haSbeensaid in A.
The

difference is

that

whereas

there

we

were

dence of the harmonia,on the elements,
its dependence on the state or process

concerned with

the

depen

now we are concerned with
of being arranged er attuned.

Arg umen t B p ro c eed s by way of two, further premisses, b2,
that no soul is m or e or less (of) a soul than any other (93b4-7)
and b3, that a good so ul is in tune and a bad soul out of tune
(93b8-cl0).
Neither of these premisses is felt to require any
justification or explanation; the sense of the latter is c learly
that the good man is not a prey to the conflicting desires and
impulses which are the mark of the bad man, but has all his
wants properly under c on tr o l with a view to the attainment of the
right ends.
We now come to one of the most problematical pas
sages in the argument:
at 93dl-5 Socrates says that premiss

b2 is the same as the pro p o s it ion
more or less ( of ) a harmonia than

(b2.l) t h at no harmonia is
any other, and Simrnias agrees.
Of course b2 is no t as it stands equivalent to this, and the
question is what a d di t ional assumptions Plato must have used in
order to produce what he considered a v a l id equivalence.
Clear
ly we cannot arrive at such an equivalence simply by making the
most obvious a ssumpt ion , viz. the assumption under examination
in this argument, that the soul is a harmonia, sin ce taken

together with b2 that would still a l l o wth at some harmoniai
might be more or less h ar moni ai than others.
But did Plato

that?

ing

I

that

see

am inclined to think that he did

the'

thing which

soul

is

a harmonia,

is true of

soul is

no t , but rather assum
took this to mean that every

also true of harmonia

(using

these terms in the unquantified style f amiliar from Aristotle).
In effect this is to

confuse implication with equivalence,

seems a not unlikely error for
hi s philosophical development,

Plato to commit at this
since it is only in the

which

stage

in

Sophist

that he clearly distinguishes predication from identity.
The standard modern interpretation of this s en t e nce , adopted
by Archer-Hind, Bluck, Hackforth and Miss Hicken (but not by

Bu r n e t )

differs from the above in taking S o c r at e s to be assert
ing not a general proposition about all harmoniai, but a specific
proposition about th e sort of harmoniai, that souls are, viz.

that no soul-harmonia is more or less of a harmonia than any
other.
As this requires an a dmit t e dl y unnatural reading of the
text as it stands, many s c holars (see Hackforth's note, p. 116)

have suggested removing the
the sentence read 'And this

word h armon ia s

from d4, thus making
(namely the admission that no soul
is more or less (of) a soul than any other) is the admission
that no fuoul) is more or less a h a rmon i a than any other.'
But
since this e me n d a ti on lacks any m an u sc rip t aut hori t y , and des

troys

what

looks

like

a very

emphatic and

deliberate

parallelismm
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of sentence construction, it is worth asking whether there are
c ogent grounds either for emending the text, or for reading the
received text in other than its natural sense.
The strangest
ground appears

since

by

the argument is to depend on the
(in particular,

Miss Hicken,

that

assumption that some

degrees, it would
be flatly inconsistent if Plato also used the assumption that
no harmonia admits of degrees.
I doubt the cogency of this
argument, which seems to me to depend on a confusion· over the
notion of 'degrees of attunement'.
For the thesis that some
harmoniai (e.g. goodness) admit or degrees comes to this, that
some things, e.g. the parts of the soul, may be so arranged as
to approximate more or less closely to s £ me norm which represents
the perfect arrangement of those things.
B�t that is in no way
in compatible with the thesis which I take Plato to be asserting
at 93dl-5, viz. that if what a thing is is a harmonia, it can't
This amounts to
be more or less a harmonia than anythin� else.
an extension of the truism 'Everything is what it is', and ap
plies equally to degrees of harmonia, in the sense just explain•
ed.
Every inter-relation of parts of the soul, at ·whatever remove ..
from the norm, is an inter-relation of parts.
There is, then,
no general incompatibility between the thesis 'No harmonia is
more or less a harmonia than any other' and 'Some things are
more attuned (in Platonic terms 'partake more of harmonia') than
others'.
Plato, however, thinks contradiction arises if one tries
to say that one harmonia is more attuned than some other:
that
he is wrong even in this restricted thesis will be seen once the
argument is viewed as a whole.
The next step (93d6-8) is that something which is neither
more nor less (of) a harmonia is neither more or less attuned:
this follows directly by contraposition from bl.l, and may hence
be called bl.2. Another problematic sentence follows (d9-10):
'And does that which is neither more nor less attuned partake
more or less of attunement, or to just the same extent?
To the
same extent.'
At first sight it might appear that this is the
converse of the pr6position stated immediately before (and it
is so taken by Miss Hicken):
But, firstly, in contrast to
the previous sentence, where the subject is 'that which is
neither more nor less a harmonia', the predicate of 39-lOis
'partakes of (i.e. is characterised by) harmonia more or less'.
One might indeed see here a further confusion of predication
and identity, but the shift in terminology is presumably intend
ed to indicate that a new point is being made.
Secondly, if
d9-10 is interpreted as 'Something which is neither more nor
harmoniai

!

to be that urged e.g.
goodness)

admit of

1
Another sense in which harmoniai admit of degrees is e�em
plified by temperature, where the inter-relation of hot and
cdld:!.ma.kes up a continuous scale, but that is irrelevant for
the purposes of this discussion, since there is no norm of
heat or cold, and so no sense in which one temperature might
be thought to be more or less arranged than another�
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less a t t u n e d is neither more nor less a harmonia, 'it has no
in the argument, whereas if it is read 'Something
which is neither more nor less attuned is neither more nor less
harmonious', we have a straightforward a r g ume nt of a syllogistic
form, a s will be seen below.
Socrates next c o n c l ude s (93dl2-e2) that no soul is more or
less attuned or a r r an g e d than any other, givin� as premisses b2
and apparently bl.2.
But cle ar l y some additional premisses are
req u i re d , viz.
the understoodassumption that the soul is a
harm o ni a and b2.l, that no harmonia i s more or less a harmonia
than any other.
In fact the c onc l us i o n follows from thesetwo
together with bl.2, w ithout depending on b2, but since Plato
regarded b2 and b2.l a s equivalent he would not h�ve noticed the
r e d und ancy .
From thi s point on the argument proceeds strai�ht
forwardly.
From b5 and b6 it follows syllogistically that no
soul is more or le s s h a r monio u s than any other (e4-5) and hence,
It is
by b3 that no soul is better or worse than any other.
agree d (94al2-b3) that thi s c onc lu s ion is absurd, and hence
one of the premisses from which it is derived must be false;
obviously, the one to be rejected is the a ssumption that the
soul i s a harmonia.
It appears, therefore that in B we have a single argument
which is, despite some obscuritie s c l e ar in it s main lines and
(perhap s not so c learl y ) fallacious.
The flaw is not simply in
the fallacious equivalence of b2 and b2.l, since one might patch
this up by introducing b2.l as an independent assumption; it
is perfectly p lausible to suggest that. where ¢ is a predicate
saying what kind of this its s ub j e ct is if A and B are both
¢s, A c an ' t be more ( of) a � than B.
A more serious flaw is
that the kind of harmonia whose presence or ab s enc e makes a
soul good or bad l s n ot the same kind as that which makes a
soul to be a soul; the l atter is a harmonia of bodily elements,
vihei•ea s the fgrmer is a harmonia of parts of the s o u l , or of
desire s and emotions, or similar p sy chical entities.
Thus when
Plato argues that because no soul can be more of a soul-harmonia
than any other therefore no soul can have more 'virtue'-harmonia
than any other, he is guilty of a fa ll a c y of equivocation.
An
One might reasonably
illu s t ration should make the point clear.
say that some p i ece of music was a harmonia in that it was pro
duced by strings playing together in certain ratios, and yet that 1
it lacked h a rmon i a in that some of the strings were out of tune
with one another.1
We may thus reject the opinion of most com
mentat or s (most vigorously expre ssed by Mi ss Hicken) that to say
that something which is a harmonia either has or lacks a harmonia
i s as absurd as to say that a blow is either vulnerable or invul
nerable or that a length either has or lacks a length. And in
rejecting thi s opinion we reject Plato's argument and defend the
propriety of holding both that that the soul is an entity which
depend s on some relation of bodily elements and that it itself
contains parts or faculties which can be better or w o r s e integrat
Put like thatll these propositions both seem
e d with one another.
e
aso
n
able
enough,
and
it is perhaps su r p r i s in g to no t ic e the
r
e agerness with which writers on Plato have insisted that one mu st
abandon one or the other.
subsequent ro l e

·
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of the

Phaedo )

occurre dto

refuted.

those

who

This

difficulty

does not

so enthusiastically endorse

seem to

have

Socrates'

arguments here.
In fact, the argument3 of the Phaedo are not
Their
decisive against any version of the harmonia thes i s.
main importance lies in making explicit the incompatibility
of p h y sic a l determinism with a view of the non-physical soul
as an autonomous agent, but this is far from showing that
the deterministic thesis is false.

C.

C.

W.

Taylor

Oxford University

APPENDIX

al

The qualities of a ha rmon i a are determined by those
of its e le ments .
P(remiss)

92e4-93a2

The activity or pas sivi ty of a harmonia is deter
mined by the activity or passivity of its elements.
(from al)

a4-5

al

al. l

al

al.11

It is impos s i b le
elements.

al

al.12

It is impos s ible for a harmonia to be affected con
tr ary to it s elements.
(from al.1)

B

bl

I

bl

bll

.. b2
b3
b2

b2.l

for a harmonia to control its
(from al .1)

A h armon i a must be

as it is attuned.

If a harmonia is more or less a t t u ne d
or l e s s a harmonia
No soul is more or les s

a

p

it is more

al4-b2

(from bl)

soul than any other.

A good soul possesses harmony,
harmony.

a

all-12

bad so��.dis

p
···P .

b4-7
bB-clO

No harmonia is more or less a h arm oni a than any
(from b2 by equivalence:
invalid)

dl-5

Something which is neither more nor le ss a h ar mo nia
is anither more nor less attuned.
(from bl.l by contraposition)

d6-8

o ther.

bl

bl,b2,

bl. 2

i m p li ci t

b4

(The s o u l is

b5

Something which is neither more nor less attun e d
possesses neither more nor less harmony.

a harmonia).

P

d9 -10

b6

No soul is more or less a ttuned than any

dl2-e2

bl,b2,
b 4 , b5

b7

No soul possesses m ore or less harmony than any
(b5, b6)
other.

e 4- 5

bl-5

bB

No s ou l is be tt e r or worse thany any other. (b3, b6)

e7-9 4al0

bl-3
b5 .

b9

The soul �s hbt a harmonia.
(from b4, b8 by reductio ad absurdum')

Al

a2

other.
(bl.2, b2 . l , b4)

b4

soul controls a nd opposes bod ily inclinations.P

Re-statement of al.11 and al.12.

al
al,a2

The

a3

The

soul is not a harmonia.

al2-b3

b4-cl

c3-7
c8-95a2

